This study investigates the pricing of financial risks associated with biodiversity conservation, with a particular focus on the Green Shield Action, a major regulatory initiative launched in China in 2017 to enforce biodiversity preservation rules in national nature reserves. While the initiative improved biodiversity, it also significantly increased bond yields for municipalities that are home to these reserves, effectively raising the general cost of public capital. These effects were primarily driven by heightened default risks plausibly caused by transition costs from shutting down illegal economic activities within the reserves and additional public spending on biodiversity conservation, even when local governments raise the same amount of money. Furthermore, the study reveals that the biological benefits of these conservation policies were not adequately recognized or impounded into the prices by the capital markets.
This article discusses that government venture capital funds in China are more geographically dispersed than private venture capital, particularly in inland and less developed areas, and they are more inclined to invest in AI companies with weaker ex-ante productivity signals.
The experience gained by individual investors from participating in venture capital funds significantly enhances their entrepreneurial capabilities in the high-tech sector.
Our study also contributes to the broader discourse on industrial policy (see Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik 2023 for a recent review of related academic literature). As debates about green industrial policy gains traction in the U.S., Europe, and beyond, there is revived interest in developing a better understanding of how it might impact economic activity. Although economic growth and environmental regulation are often pitted against each other, our findings suggest that this need not be the case.
The Chinese mutual fund industry is only one-tenth the size of its US counterpart, but the number of funds in China has surpassed that of the US. Our study shows that such a large number of funds is unhealthy: managers issue new funds repetitively with different custodian banks, resulting in the average manager overseeing 2.7 funds. Managers shift profits to new funds in order to attract more flows. Among funds under the same manager, new funds have higher returns than old funds, spurring concerns over investor protection.