This article discusses that government venture capital funds in China are more geographically dispersed than private venture capital, particularly in inland and less developed areas, and they are more inclined to invest in AI companies with weaker ex-ante productivity signals.
The article discussess that China's policy reform of integrating counties into larger prefecture-level divisions (che xian she qu) significantly promoted regional economic specialization, reduced interregional market barriers, and played a crucial role in driving economic growth.The article discussess that China's policy reform of integrating counties into larger prefecture-level divisions (che xian she qu) significantly promoted regional economic specialization, reduced interregional market barriers, and played a crucial role in driving economic growth.
Chinese municipal bonds are considerably overpriced in the primary market, leading regulators to set a lower bound on the issuance yield spread. This paper investigates the underlying reasons for this overpricing and evaluates the effects of implementing restrictions on yield spreads. Our findings indicate that underwriters may inflate prices to receive undisclosed benefits from local governments, such as local treasury cash deposits. We further show that the lower bounds severely impede price discovery in the primary municipal bond market. Even bonds not restricted by the lower limit are priced at the reference spread, exacerbating overpricing of riskier bonds. Local governments exploit these fixed prices by increasing the bond issuance amount and extending bond maturity. Our findings suggest that regulatory interference in pricing can have unintended consequences for pricing efficiency and that attempts to rectify mispricing may result in even more severe mispricing.
This article discusses how reducing frictions across Chinese provinces could significantly improve aggregate output, lower spatial inequality, and discourage population concentration in large cities.
The research findings indicate that after the failure of a small bank, regulatory authorities did not fully bail out all creditors as had been the norm, and this policy shift affected the funding costs and market confidence of banks with lower systemic importance (SU).