Massive monetary injections occurred in 2009Q1-Q4 as a result of a drastic change in monetary policy causing an unprecedented credit expansion in 2009-2011, which stimulated economic growth in the short-run. New credit was disproportionately allocated to real estate and its supporting heavy industries and fueled a sharp rise in land prices. The long-lasting consequence of this monetary stimulus resulted in a twin problem facing China: the high investment-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios.
We construct a US–China Tensions index (UCT) and examine its economic transmission effects. The index spikes notably around the 2008 unrest in Tibet and the China military buildup, the 2018 arrest of a Huawei executive, and the 2018–2019 trade disputes. The index reaches its peak at the onset of the 2020 global pandemic. We interpret such tension as reflecting both the realization of new barriers between the two countries and the risk of existing barriers escalating. We show that heightened US–China Tension has adverse economic effects...
We study credit allocation across firms and its real effects during China’s economic stimulus plan of 2009-2010 using loan-level data from the 19 largest Chinese banks matched with firm-level data on manufacturing firms. We find that the stimulus-driven credit expansion significantly affected firm borrowing, investment, and employment. The plan disproportionately favored state-owned firms and firms with a lower marginal product of capital, reversing the process of capital reallocation that characterized China’s high growth before 2008.
By exploiting the exogenous variation in air pollution caused by China’s central heating policy, we find that air pollution reduces the accumulation of executive talent and high-quality employees. We also find that firms located in polluted areas have poorer performance, especially for firms with greater dependence on human capital.
Many people have attributed China’ s growth since 2001 to its accession to WTO and the resulting rapid export expansion. We provide quantitative evidence showing that internal economic reform, not export expansion, was the real driver of China’ s growth in the period after 2001. We also show that there is still large potential growth from further internal reform in China.