China’s stock market imposes various trading restrictions such as daily price limits and trading suspension rules, which are intended to stabilize the market during turmoil. During China’s stock market crash in the summer of 2015, these trading restrictions made many highly valued stocks non-tradable and consequently caused mutual funds facing redemption pressure or with precautious concerns to sell other tradable stocks, exacerbating their price drops.
In China, the college entrance exam score is predictive for both firm success and wage-job success in the future, yet higher-score individuals are less likely to create firms.
As the second largest economy, China intrigues heated debates among policymakers and researchers alike on how fast its economy will grow in the future and how truthfully the official data reflect its actual economic growth. Patrick Higgins and Tao Zha from the Atlanta Fed and Karen Zhong from Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance develop a replicable econometric model to shed light on these issues.
Official unemployment rate in China is based on registered unemployment figures, but the official figures are likely underestimates of the true unemployment rates because many unemployed people are not qualified to register with government agencies and even those who are qualified may choose not to for various reasons. Shuaizhang Feng of Jinan University, and Yingyao Hu and Robert Moffitt, both of Johns Hopkins University, discuss their new effort to provide the first comprehensive picture of China’s labor market for the period 1988-2009 using Urban Household Survey (UHS) data administered by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
We identify bank loans to China’s local government financing vehicles and find that 1.7% of the loans that matured during the sample period failed to make the due payments. The LGFV loan default rate is much higher for commercial banks than for the China Development Bank, which provides more comprehensive financing for local governments than typical commercial banks. This selective default pattern is weaker during the ¥4-trillion stimulus period but stronger after 2010 when commercial banks exited the LGFV market.