China’s coal-fired power system combines binding generation targets with carbon dioxide (CO2) caps set at different administrative levels. Using generator-level data from the China Southern Power Grid Corporation and a structural model that captures differences in returns to scale and unobserved productivity, we show that moving coordination from plants to provinces or the regional grid can lower both coal costs and CO2 emissions without reducing aggregate generation. Relative to plant-level allocation, province-level ..
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOE) dominate key upstream industries such as energy, telecommunications, and finance, while downstream industries are largely open to private competition. We refer to this asymmetry in both state ownership and market structure along the supply chain as the vertical structure...
How do agents allocate efforts when some tasks are governed by continuous rewards while others impose minimum standards? This question is central to many organizations and it is especially salient in public governance...
How can fast-growing economies share economic gains with cohorts whose working lives end before wages catch up? We show that subsidized access of appreciating public assets can give incumbent households an early stake in future growth. A quantitative model of China’s housing privatization shows that buyers benefit from both purchase discounts and subsequent capital gains. Compared with a pension delivering the same average welfare gain, this policy leaves later cohorts better off and adjusts automatically when growth slows.
When treaty ports opened late-Qing China to modern business, did the country’s educated elite rush into industry—or only part of it? Using a new bibliometric measure of regional scholarship and the staggered opening of ports, we show that upper-tail human capital significantly boosted modern firm creation, yet the margin came chiefly from literati with weak or no Imperial Ex-amination (Kējǔ) credentials, not from the examination’s highest achievers. Before the Kējǔ was abolished in 1905, industrialization drew on a vast pool of latent scholarly talent that meritocratic officialdom had left outside the bureaucracy.