This article discusses that the judicial centralization reform gradually implemented in China since 2014 has enhanced the independence of the judicial system, limited the intervention of local governments, and reduced court biases in favor of local governments.
Using the unique institutional feature of government regulations in China, we provide robust evidence that firms with a larger employment size have significantly better access to bond credit.
The research findings indicate that after the failure of a small bank, regulatory authorities did not fully bail out all creditors as had been the norm, and this policy shift affected the funding costs and market confidence of banks with lower systemic importance (SU).
This study examines the impacts of political competition on eco-efficiency. We first develop a theoretical model in which local government officials compete against each other to maximize their own political score. We find that after an initial stage of decline, eco-efficiency eventually increases once environmental performance becomes a meaningful component of local government officials’ annual assessment. These theoretical predictions are corroborated...
How are global financial uncertainty shocks transmitted across borders? What is the role of nonfinancial multinational companies in the cross-border shock transmission? Using Chinese firm-level data, we find that rising global financial uncertainty has a significantly larger contractionary effect on real investment for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) than their local counterparts. The differential responses to global financial uncertainty are more pronounced for firms...