China implemented Basel III in 2013 and tightened bank capital regulations. Empirical evidence shows that the new regulations significantly reduced bank risk-taking following monetary policy easing. To meet the tightened capital requirements, banks respond to a balance-sheet expansion by raising the share of lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are perceived as low-risk borrowers under government...
It seems necessary that one gains some deeper understanding of the sources of China’s phenomenal economic growth. Apart from all well-founded extant explanations, my recent book Guaranteed Bubble argues for another important yet previously overlooked source: the guarantees provided by the Chinese government.
The Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL), announced in 2003, is a landmark law for agricultural households in rural China. It provides new legal protections for leasing agricultural land. In theory, increasing free market exchanges of land should improve agricultural productivity by facilitating the movement of land towards the most productive users. We find that the property rights reform led to a 10 percent increase in land rental activity among rural households, a redistribution of land towards more productive farmers, and a 7 percent increase in the aggregate productivity of land. We also observe an increased responsiveness of land allocation across crops to changes in crop prices.
Local governments, which serve as monopolistic land sellers in China, face a trade-off when deciding to supply residential land versus industrial land. This trade-off is determined by the different time profiles of revenues from industrial and residential land sales, local governments’ financial constraints, and the extent of local governments’ tax revenue sharing with other levels of government.
Trade disputes between the United States and China greatly intensified recently as the two countries announced a 25 percent tariff hike on $50 billion worth of products imported from each other, raising the risk of a trade war between the two giant trading economies. Based on a standard multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium trade model with input-output linkages, we evaluate the cost of a trade war in which the United States and China both increase their tariffs to 45% for all imports from each other. We find that the United States would be more likely to be the bigger loser and that the cost for China would be moderate.