Using business registry data from China, we show that internal capital markets in business groups can propagate corporate shareholders' credit supply shocks to their subsidiaries. An average of 16.7% local bank credit growth where corporate shareholders are located would increase subsidiaries investment by 1% of their tangible fixed asset value, which accounts for 71% (7%) of the median (average) investment rate among these firms...
In 2020, local governments in China began issuing digital coupons to stimulate spending in targeted categories such as restaurants and supermarkets. We find that the coupons caused large increases in spending of 3.1–3.3 yuan per yuan spent by the government. The large spending responses do not come from substitution away from non-targeted spending categories or from short-run intertemporal substitution. We conclude that digital coupons are a cost-effective way to provide targeted fiscal stimulus to specific sectors of the economy.
The study explores the impact of migration controls on urban fiscal policies and the intergenerational transmission of human capital accumulation in China. It shows that migrants provide large positive fiscal externalities to major cities. The study evaluates the feasibility and effectiveness of alternative migration policies that offer the potential of decreasing inequality within China, while at the same time promoting growth via increasing the aggregate level of human capital in the economy.
Using big data of the locations of bank branches and borrowers in China, we document a non-trivial amount of distant lending. The inter-firm network helps banks collect soft information which facilitates the distant lending. We also use novel data of monthly internal loan rating changes to directly measure soft information and find that banks have better soft information and predict delinquent events more accurately for borrowers connected via the inter-firm network.
There was a bubble in the prices of put warrants traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during the summer of 2007. We use investor trading records from a large securities firm to show that put warrant investors engaged in a particular form of feedback trading. This feedback trading exacerbated an initial run-up in put warrant prices caused by a change in the stock transaction tax, and created the bubble.