China’s household savings rate has been persistently high since the early 1980s despite rapid economic growth and contrary to the predictions of the standard consumption theory. Since China has undergone large structural changes in its transition to a market economy, precautionary savings seem to be a plausible contributing factor to the high savings rate. We use China’s large-scale reform of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s as a natural experiment to identify exogenous changes in income uncertainty. We estimate that precautionary savings account for about 40 percent of SOE households’ wealth accumulation from 1995 to 2002.
Since 2010–2011, China’s economy has slowed considerably, raising concerns that the country could fall into the so-called “middle-income trap” (MIT). Obviously, an MIT in China would have serious negative consequences not only for the Chinese population but also for the world economy as a whole. We examine whether China is or will be in an MIT by focusing on the empirical MIT definitions and the MIT triggering factors identified in the literature. We show that dependent on the choice of MIT definition, different MIT statements can be derived. Our triggering factor analysis reveals that while China performs quite well regarding its export structure, it must improve human capital accumulation and total factor productivity to avoid falling into an MIT.
We find that the widely adopted daily price limit rules may induce large investors as a group to pursue a destructive trading strategy of pushing stock prices to the upper price limit and then profiting from selling these stocks on the next day. Their trading accelerates the price increase on the day that the upper price limit is reached, thus leading to the so-called Magnet Effect. This unintended effect renders the daily price limits — a market stabilization scheme — counterproductive.
China’s real estate market has been a key engine of its sustained economic expansion. This paper argues, however, that even before the COVID-19 shock, a decades-long housing boom had given rise to price misalignments and regional supply-demand mismatches, making an adjustment both necessary and inevitable. Based on input-output analysis and benchmarking against other economies, we estimate the size of China’s real estate–related activities to be 29% of the economy and conclude that the sector is quite vulnerable to a sustained aggregate growth shock.
VoxChina welcomes views from industry reports and policy reports.This piece summaries the views about China’s financial risk from - Hao Zhou, the PBC School of Finance at Tsinghua University, Haibin Zhu, J.P. Morgan and Xiangpeng Chen, the PBC School of Finance at Tsinghua University.