General Motors and Apple sold more cars and iPhones in China than in the US, but their sales were not counted as US exports to China, as these were made and sold in China. Policymakers should look at both trade and local sales by foreign firms (the FDI channel) to gauge bilateral economic balance. We estimate that US firms sold more goods and services to China than Chinese firms sold to the US in 2017, once the FDI channel is taken into account.
With over twenty years of experience at the frontline of China’s monetary policy operations and with two decades of academic research experience, I provide a unique, first-hand perspective on a number of facets dealing with China’s monetary policy and theory. The book opens with an introduction of monetary theories, including my credit monetary theory, followed by a review of some focal issues regarding China’s monetary policy and a discussion of the RMB exchange rate regime and international balance. The book presents China as a country at a crossroads, forced to choose between the free flow of capital and monetary policy independence.
When comparing the credit ratings of domestic and global agencies on Chinese corporations, because of the differences in ratings scales, it is best to focus on the domestic and global agency orderings of relative credit risk. Testing for differences in the determinants of ratings, we find that asset size is weighed more heavily as a positive factor by domestic agencies, while profitability and state-ownership are weighed more positively by global rating agencies, which also weigh leverage more heavily as a negative factor. In spite of these differences, both domestic and global ratings appear to be priced into the market values of rated bonds.
Trade disputes between the United States and China greatly intensified recently as the two countries announced a 25 percent tariff hike on $50 billion worth of products imported from each other, raising the risk of a trade war between the two giant trading economies. Based on a standard multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium trade model with input-output linkages, we evaluate the cost of a trade war in which the United States and China both increase their tariffs to 45% for all imports from each other. We find that the United States would be more likely to be the bigger loser and that the cost for China would be moderate.
The Chinese economy had spectacular growth in the past three decades, however the Chinese stock market had the worst performance among the major stock markets. Professor Franklin Allen from Imperial College, Professor Jun Qian from Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University, and coauthors offer their explanation of this puzzling divergence.